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SUCCESSFUL NEW PRODUCT PRICING PRACTICES: 
A CONTINGENCY APPROACH 
 
Abstract 
The purpose of this study is to examine the success of new product pricing practices and 
the conditions upon which success is contingent. We distinguish three different pricing 
practices based on the information they are based on: information on customer value, 
competition, and costs. Following Monroe’s (1990) price discretion, we argue that the 
success of these practices is contingent on relative product advantage and competitive 
intensity. The hypotheses are tested on pricing decisions for new industrial products. Our 
results show that there are no general “best” or “bad” practices, but that a contingency 
approach is appropriate. These results may help reduce the complexity that managers 
experience in pricing  new products. 
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Pricing research in marketing has predominantly focused on normative strategies (e.g. 
Tellis 1986), and consumers’ price and value perceptions (e.g. Gijsbrechts 1993). Few 
studies have focused on the practices through which organizations arrive at price settings 
(e.g. Cressman 1999b, Monroe and Mazumdar 1988, Oxenfeldt 1973, Rao 1984).  
    Pricing literature suggests that firms set prices by assessing customer elasticity 
and  competitive  prices  and  then  set  prices  to  maximize  profits  (Pashigian  1998).  In 
organizational  practice  however,  pricing  is  far  more  complex  than  suggested  in  the 
pricing  literature  (Diamantopoulos  1991,  Oxenfeldt  1973).  From  a  resource-based 
perspective,  for  example,  pricing  is  a  complex  process  that  requires  resources  and 
coordination (Dutta, Zbaracki, and Bergen 2001). The means through which firms arrive 
at price decisions are referred to as pricing practices. In the past, research has examined 
pricing practices in case studies of pricing processes (Bonoma, Crittenden, and Dolan 
1988, Foxall 1972, Hague 1971), and in surveys of pricing methods such as value-based, 
competition-based, and cost-based pricing (Abratt and Pitt 1985, Piercy 1981, Tzokas, 
Hart, Argouslidis, and Saren 2000, Udell 1972). 
  Our  study  aims  to  contribute  to  this  literature  in  several  ways.  We  examine 
pricing  in  the  context  of  new  product  price  decisions.  The  complexity  of  pricing  is 
perhaps nowhere felt harder than in this situation, and the necessity for insight in success 
factors more urgent (Shapiro and Jackson 1978). Our study is the first to examine the 
success of three pricing practices with respect to different types of information used in 
the  pricing  process  (respectively  on  customer  value,  competition,  and  costs).  In  this 
respect, we follow recent calls for research on successful pricing practices (Cressman 
1999, Noble and Gruca 1999b). Second, we show that the effects of value-, competition-,   2 
and cost-information on new product performance are contingent on product and market 
characteristics.  In  particular,  we  examine  the  moderating  effects  of  relative  product 
advantage  and  competitive  intensity  on  new  product  success.  In addition,  we  discuss 
several measurement issues that are relevant to survey research on pricing practices. 
    In  the  following  sections  we  discuss  pricing  as  an  organizational  process, 
introduce  the  concepts  included  in  our  study,  and  formulate  hypotheses.  Next,  the 
empirical method and results are presented. The hypotheses are tested in three different 
models representing three different contingencies on 77 introductions of new industrial 
products. Finally, results are discussed and implications for future research identified, 
including measurement issues that are relevant for future research on pricing practices. 
 
1. THE PRICING PROCESS 
As pricing textbooks make clear, pricing is enormously complex in business practice 
(Monroe 1990; Nagle and Holden 1995). Firms that are more competent in pricing, deal 
with this complexity in superior ways (Dutta, Zbaracki, and Bergen 2001, Monroe 1990). 
To  deal  with  complexity,  firms  do  not  analyze  all  available  information,  but 
engage in pricing practices (Hague 1971). Pricing practices refer to the set of activities 
executed by an organization’s managers that lead to a price decision. They occur in the 
context  of  an  organizational  process  in  which  information  is  gathered,  shared  and 
interpreted.  Whereas  pricing  strategies  are  visible  in  the  market  in the  form  of  price 
changes, price bundles, price levels within a product line, or otherwise (Noble and Gruca 
1999a),  pricing  practices  are  hidden  behind  the  boundaries  of  the  organization.  Prior 
contributions to empirical pricing literature (e.g. Tzokas, Hart, Agrouslidis, and Saren   3 
2000) often use the term pricing methods to indicate the activities firms use to set prices. 
Since  the  term  pricing  methods  is  often  interpreted  to  involve  mutually  exclusive 
methods, we prefer the term pricing practices, in line with qualitative evidence that firms 
use  different  types  of  information  simultaneously  in  a  price  decision  (e.g.  Bonoma, 
Crittenden, and Dolan 1988, Hague 1971, Foxall 1972, Pearce 1956). 
To clarify the superiority of certain firms in dealing with the complexity of a 
pricing process, Monroe (1990, p. 12) conceptualizes a price decision as in Figure 1. In 
determining the initial price discretion, the maximum price depends on the customers’ 
perceptions of value in the seller’s offering. Direct variable costs set a floor. A successful 
price lies between these boundaries. The complexity increases however, if the firm aims 
to understand its final price discretion. Competition may reduce the price ceiling, whereas 
corporate objectives with respect to covering indirect costs, as well as regulations may 
increase the price floor. “Normally, after considering all of these factors, there will be a 
much  narrower  range  of  pricing  discretion.  Depending  on  the  type  of  product  and 
characteristics of demand and competition, this pricing discretion could still be relatively 
large or it could be nonexistent” (Monroe 1990, p 13). Determining a successful price 
becomes therefore highly difficult. 
 
[ Insert Figure 1] 
 
In summary, firms that manage to achieve pricing objectives in superior ways are more 
competent in pricing, meaning that they deal better with the complexity of a pricing 
process. Dealing with this complexity comes down to understanding the final pricing   4 
discretion (Monroe 1990). The pricing practices in which firms engage should focus on 
those types of information that help them to understand the price discretion. These types 
of  information  depend  on  the  shape  of  the  price  discretion,  which  is  in  itself  a 
consequence  of  product  and  market  characteristics    (Monroe  1990,  p.  13).  Thus,  the 




New product performance. We examine the effect of pricing practices on new product 
performance. New product performance evaluates the achievements of the new product in 
the market since its launch, relative to its stated objectives (Atuahene-Gima 1995). We 
focus on three pricing practices that are based on the use of information on customer 
value, competition, and costs, respectively. On the basis of these types of information, 
firms can assess quantifications that may inform it about the price discretion. Because the 
use of customer value, competition, and cost information should be seen as a matter of 
degree,  rather  than  mutually  exclusive  categories,  we  use  the  terms  cost-informed, 
competition-informed, and value-informed pricing, instead of cost-based, competition-
based and value-based pricing. 
    Value-informed  pricing  informs  the  firm  about  the  question:  What  is  the 
customer’s  perception  of  our  product  value?  This  can  be  quantified  by  assessing  the 
monetary amount that customers are willing to pay for the perceived benefits they will 
receive if they accept the market offering (Nagle and Holden 1995). In the context of new   5 
industrial  products  these  may  be  cost  savings  or  increases  in  productivity  that  the 
purchasing company experiences if it adopts the product (Anderson and Narus 1999). 
    Competition-informed pricing informs the firm about the question: How and how 
much  do  competitors  charge  for  the  perceived  benefits  they  offer?  Interpreting 
competitors’ prices relative to their market position enables a quantitative assessment of 
the firm’s relative position. For example, if the firm’s product offers slightly less benefits 
than the competitor’s product, an assessment based on  competition information probably 
results in a price slightly below the competitor’s price. 
    Cost-informed  pricing  may  lead  to  assessments  of  prices  by  quantifying  the 
variable and fixed costs with respect to the development, production, and marketing of 
the new product. It informs the firm about the question: What’s the bottom-line price we 
need  in  order  to  be  profitable?  Including  information  on  fixed  costs  as  well  as 
information on variable costs is important to determine the final price discretion (Monroe 
1990). Fixed costs however increase the ambiguity of cost information since they can 
only be assessed on the basis of accurate assessments of the expected volume (Nagle and 
Holden 1995). 
    Contingencies.  With  respect  to  the  product  and  market  contingencies  that 
determine whether pricing practices contribute to new product performance, we examine 
relative product advantage and competitive intensity. First, relative product advantage 
pertains to the relative superiority of the new product over competition (Atuahene-Gima 
1995). Consistently, relative product advantage is found to be a strong predictor of new 
product performance (Henard and Szymanski 2001). Competitive intensity pertains to the 
market in which the new product was introduced (Atuahene-Gima 1995). In marketing   6 
strategy literature, competitive intensity is seen as a major force that erodes the ability of 
the firm to reap the benefits of the customer value it creates (e.g. Achrol 1991, Day and 
Montgomery 1999, Homburg and Pflesser 2000). 
 
3. HYPOTHESES 
Table 1 distinguishes between three contingencies: (1) high relative product advantage; 
(2)  high  competitive  intensity;  and  (3)  high  relative  product  advantage  and  high 
competitive intensity. 
 
[Insert Table 1] 
 
First, relative product advantage distinguishes a product from competitors’ products in 
terms  of  the  customers’  perception  of  value  (Gatignon  and  Xuereb  1997).  If  relative 
product advantage is high, the firm should be well informed about the customers’ value 
perceptions in order to assess the upper-limit of the pricing discretion (Monroe 1990). 
Thus, the higher the relative product advantage, the more value-informed pricing will 
enable  the  firm  to  understand  its  price  discretion,  and  the  more  it  contributes  to 
performance (cell 1). We hypothesize: 
 
H1:  Value-informed pricing is more effective when the relative product advantage is 
higher. 
 
Products  that  offer  low  relative  advantage  hardly  distinguish  themselves  from 
competitors’ products (Gatignon and Xuereb 1997). Therefore, these products are likely   7 
to be compared by customers, using the competitor’s price as a reference price (Monroe 
1990). In this case, competition-informed pricing enables the firm to assess the upper-
boundary of the pricing discretion. Thus, when the relative product advantage is low,  
competition-informed pricing will help the firm to understand the price discretion and 
perform better in the market. Or vice versa: the higher relative product advantage, the less 
competition-informed pricing contributes to performance (cell 2): 
 
H2:  Competition-informed  pricing  is  less  effective  when  the  relative  product 
advantage is higher. 
 
If the possibility exists that prices drop below the price floor, it is important for a firm to 
assess the lower-limit of the price discretion (Monroe 1990). High product advantage 
ensures  a  high  upper-boundary,  thereby  widening  the  price  discretion  and  making  it 
easier to determine a price between the price ceiling and price floor. If relative product 
advantage is low, the price discretion becomes narrower, making it difficult to set a price 
between the price floor and the price ceiling. This increases the chance that a price is 
determined below the price floor. In other words: the lower relative product advantage, 
the  more  cost-informed  pricing  informs  the  firm  about  the  price  discretion,  thus 
contributing to performance. Or, vice versa: the higher the relative product advantage, the 
weaker the effect of cost-informed pricing on performance (cell 3). We hypothesize: 
 
H3:  Cost-informed  pricing  is  less  effective  when the  relative  product  advantage  is 
higher. 
 
Under  conditions  of  high  competitive  intensity,  product  advantage  is  likely  to  erode 
faster. This will have a tampering effect on the upper-boundary of the price discretion   8 
(Monroe 1990). In this situation, customer value information is quickly outdated, making 
it more difficult for the firm to assess the upper-boundary of the price discretion on the 
basis of this type of information. Thus, the higher competitive intensity, the less value 
information will help firms to understand the price discretion and, therefore, the less this 
type of information enhances performance (cell 4): 
 
H4:  Value-informed pricing is less effective when competitive intensity is higher. 
 
Competitive intensity is unlikely to affect the degree to which customers can compare the 
new product with existing alternatives on the market. Therefore, it is equally difficult for 
firms to assess the upper-boundary of the price discretion on the basis of competition 
information  in  situations  of  high  and  low  competitive  intensity  (cell  5).  Competitive 
intensity  increases  the  chance  that  the  firm  will  be  confronted  with  competitors’ 
innovations  that  match  or  even  exceed  the  advantage  of  the  firm’s  product.  In  this 
situation the firm may be forced to drop the price of the product, making assessments of 
the  lower-limit  of  the  price  discretion  more  important.  Thus,  in  situations  of  high 
competitive intensity, cost-informed pricing becomes more important to understand the 
price discretion, thus increasing performance (cell 6): 
 
H5:  Cost-informed pricing is more effective when competitive intensity is higher. 
 
In the situation that a product with a high advantage over competing offerings is launched 
in a market with intense competition, the effect of value-informed pricing on the new 
product’s  performance  is  expected  neither  to  increase  nor  decrease  (cell  7).  Relative   9 
product  advantage  enhances  the  effect  of  value-informed  pricing  on  performance, 
whereas intense competition mitigates this effect at the same time. Competition-informed 
pricing is expected to have a negative effect on performance (cell 8) as relative product 
advantage has a diminishing effect on the influence of competition-informed pricing on 
performance and competitive intensity is expected to have no effect (see cell 5). Finally, 
we  expect  the  negative  effect  of  cost-informed  pricing  on  performance  under  the 
condition of high relative product advantage to be neutralized by the positive effect in 
situations of high competitive intensity (cell 9). Therefore, we formulate the following 
hypothesis with respect to both contingencies: 
 
H6:  Competition-informed  pricing  is  less  effective  when  competitive  intensity  and 
relative product advantage are is higher. 
 
4. METHOD 
4.1 Data Collection and Sample 
We developed a questionnaire that focuses on the latest new product launch in which the 
respondent’s  company  had  been  involved.  The  questionnaire  was  mailed  to  590 
marketing or general managers of firms drawn from a comprehensive Belgian industry 
database. Prior studies on pricing in industrial markets show that in many firms either the 
general manager or the marketing manager is responsible for the price decision (Abratt 
and Pitt 1985, Frambach, Nijssen, and Van Heddegem 1997). Respondents were asked to 
forward the questionnaire to a person responsible for new product pricing decisions in 
case  they  were  not  responsible  for  these  decisions  themselves.  After  receipt  of  the 
questionnaire, a recall-phone call was made and repeated every two weeks. Respondents 
were  reminded up to  three times.  A  total  of 78 questionnaires  were  finally returned,   10
representing a response rate of 13.2 %. One questionnaire was removed from the sample 
since it had too many missing values. We tested non-response bias by comparing early, 
average and late respondents (Armstrong and Overton 1977). In t-tests for all variables 
included  in  this  study,  no  significant  differences  in  the  mean  responses  were  found, 
suggesting that response bias is unlikely to be a problem. 
    Our  sample  consists  of  firms  from  the  electronics  and  engineering  industries. 
Research on pricing strategy in industrial contexts is scarce (Noble and Gruca 1999a). 
This context is particularly interesting for research on successful pricing practices for two 
reasons. First, value-informed pricing is relatively easy to implement since value can be 
quantified by for instance quantifying the increase of the customer company’s turnover 
and/or a decrease of the customer company’s costs if it adopts the innovation (Anderson 
and Narus 1999). Second, the arguments used to justify a price are likely to be carefuly 
analyzed  by  customers,  since  the  purchasing  process  of  capital-intensive  industrial 
products is typically a group decision-making process that involves intense information 
gathering (Ward and Webster 1991). The information on which a price decision is based 
may therefore impact new product performance relatively strong in this context. 
 
4.2 Measurement 
Many  prior  studies  use  mutually  exclusive  category  indicators  to  measure  pricing 
practices that do not accurately tap the degree to which different kinds of information are 
used (e.g. Abratt and Pitt 1985, Piercy 1981, Udell 1972). Also, single item measures 
(Tzokas, Hart,  Argouslidis, and Saren 2000) and summated scales (Noble and Gruca 
1999a) are unlikely to accurately tap the information used in a pricing process, for two   11
reasons.  First,  like  the domains  of many  concepts  in  social  sciences,  the  domains  of 
value-, competition-and cost-informed pricing as defined in this study, are too broad to be 
measured  by  a  single  item  (Churchill  1979).  Second,  asking  managers  about  the 
information  used  in  a  pricing  process  may  be  prone  to  a  social  response  bias,  since 
managers  are  likely  to  justify  prices  on  the  basis  of  costs.  This  observation  was 
introduced to pricing literature as early as the 1950s (Pearce 1956) and later used by 
Foxall (1972), but seems to be overlooked by more recent studies on pricing practices. 
    Therefore,  to  measure  value-,  competition-,  and  cost-informed  pricing,  we 
developed new multiple-item measures. We created an item pool on the basis of literature 
and interviews in various industries (Churchill 1979). Items were measured using a 10-
point scale, the upper-end indicating “played a major role in price setting”, and the lower-
end indicating “was not important at all in price setting”. 
    In order to minimize the risk of a social response bias, items on customer value, 
competition and cost factors were presented in the questionnaire in random order, also 
including a number of additional items not measuring any of the three groups of pricing 
factors included in this study. As a final check on a possible social response bias in value-
, competition-, and cost-informed pricing, we conducted 10 interviews. In 5 interviews 
we asked managers to fill out a questionnaire with purified scales in which the items 
measuring factors on which prices are based were presented in random order. After they 
finished, we asked them to describe the pricing process of the new product, as well as to 
indicate what kind of information they used and on what information the final price is 
based, using the interview techniques advised by Pearce (1956) and Foxall (1972). In the 
other 5 interviews we followed the same procedure but started with the open questions   12
and finished with the questionnaire. In all 10 interviews, the stories told by the managers 
generally fit the answers to the questionnaire. This leads us to conclude that a social 
response bias is not a problem in our scales. 
    Measures  on  new  product  performance,  relative  product  advantage  and 
competitive intensity were adapted from Atuahene-Gima (1995). With respect to new 
product performance, respondents were asked to rate the degree to which the product had 
been successful in meeting its objectives since its launch. Items were measured on a 10-
point scale, the lower end indicating “wasn’t reached at all” and the upper end indicating 
“was completely reached”.  
    After  collecting  the  data,  all  measures  used  in  this  study  were  subjected  to 
purification using exploratory factor analysis, and reliability coefficient alpha (Churchill 
1979). This approach was chosen over a confirmatory factor analysis, since our sample is 
too small to match the advised 1 to 10 data-parameter ratio of structural models (Kline 
1998). In order not to violate this ratio in the exploratory analysis, only two constructs 
were compared at a time. All pairs of measures were compared. Items that had very weak 
loadings or loaded on more than one factor were eliminated. To enhance discriminant 
validity, items that relate directly to pricing strategies as studied by Noble and Gruca 
(1999a) were included, like the degree to which the price is based on learning curve 
effects (skimming), penetration, or product line. These items generally loaded on more 
than one factor, which supports our view that pricing strategies are the result of a pricing 
process  in  which  different  sources  of  information  are  used.  Next,  the  reliability 
coefficient  alpha  of  each  measure  was  calculated  and  item-to-total  correlations  were 
inspected. Items with low correlations were eliminated. The final scales closely represent   13
the concepts’ domains, as they were initially defined. Cronbach Alphas range from .73 to 
.91 and therefore our measures can be considered reliable. 
    The use of 10-point scales has the advantage that it is the most common rating 
scale in Belgium. It has a disadvantage in that extreme scores may strongly impact the 
mean of all scale items. For this reason we standardized item scores before calculating 
the scale means that are imputed in the regression analyses, which satisfies the condition 
that all scale items are equally important (Churchill 1979). All scales used in this study 
are reported in the appendix. The correlation matrix of the purified measures is reported 
in Table 2. 
 
[Insert Table 2] 
 
4.3 Theory Testing Approach 
The three contingencies of new product launch were each tested in a separate model. This 
enables us to detect the impact of the proposed contingencies independently from each 
other.  As  such,  the  first  model  tests  the  interactions  with  respect  to  relative  product 
advantage, the second model with respect to competitive intensity, and the third model 
with respect to relative product advantage and competitive intensity. We run moderating 
regression analyses including simple effects of all components, as well as multiplicative 
interaction  terms  of  independent  and  proposed  moderator  variables  (Irwin  and 
McClelland  2001).  Significant  interaction  terms  suggest  that  the  moderator  variable 
(relative product advantage, competitive intensity) modifies the relationship between the   14
independent  variable  (e.g.  cost-informed  pricing)  and  the  dependent  variable  (new 
product performance) (Schoonhoven 1981). 
 
[Insert  Table 3] 
 
5. RESULTS  
The  simple  effects  (Part  A,  Table  3)  suggest  that  value-informed  pricing  generally 
contributes  to  new  product  performance,  whereas  competition-informed  and  cost-
informed pricing have no significant effect. These findings suggest that value-informed 
pricing  generally  improves  new  product  performance  beyond  the  hypothesized 
contingency  effects.  The  effect  of  relative  product  advantage  on  new  product 
performance is found in most studies on new product development, and is confirmed here 
(Henard and Szymanski 2001). Our result on the effect of competitive intensity on new 
product performance suggests that firms in highly competitive environments are more 
satisfied with achieving new product objectives than firms in stable environments and 
thus report higher scores on new product performance. 
    With respect to our findings on high relative product advantage (Part B, Table 3), 
we  find  a  significant  positive  interaction  effect  for  value-informed  and  a  significant 
negative  interaction  effect  for  competition-informed  pricing.  These  results  support 
hypotheses 1 and 2 respectively. Contrary to hypothesis 3, we find no interaction effect 
for cost-informed pricing. 
    In situations of high competitive intensity (Part C, Table 3), we find a negative 
interaction effect for value-informed, a positive interaction effect for cost-informed and   15
no effect for competition-informed  pricing, which  is consistent with our expectations 
(Hypotheses 4 and 5). 
    In situations of high relative product advantage and competitive intensity (Part D, 
Table  3),  we  find  a  negative  effect  for  competition-informed  pricing  supporting 
hypothesis 6. In addition, we find no interaction effect for value-informed pricing and a 
positive effect for cost-informed pricing. The positive effect of cost-informed pricing is 
unexpected,  but  in  line  with  the  non-significant  effect  of  cost-informed  pricing  and 
relative product advantage. We will discuss these findings in the next section. To check 
the  stability  of  these  findings,  we  carried  out  a  jackknifing  analysis  by  randomly 
removing 5 respondents at a time and repeating the analysis. Since only little variation in 
the results was obtained, our results may be considered stable (Hair, Anderson, Tatham, 
and Black 1995). 
 
6. DISCUSSION 
The  objective  of  this  study  is  to  improve  our  understanding  of  the  success  and  the 
contingencies to success of pricing practices. Our results show that the success of using 
information on customer value, competition, and costs in setting prices, is contingent 
upon relative product advantage and competitive intensity. Only value-informed pricing 
has  a  strong  direct  effect  on  new  product  performance.  The  effectiveness  of  cost-
informed and competition-informed pricing depends on whether the product has a high 
relative  advantage  and  on  whether  competitive  intensity  in  the  market  is  high.  This 
suggests  that  there  is  no  generally  “best”  or  “bad”  practice,  but  that  a  contingency 
approach is appropriate. Our findings with respect to the conditions under which pricing   16
practices  contribute  to  new  product  performance  may  reduce  the  complexity  firms 
experience in pricing a new product. In addition to our substantive results, we have come 
across several measurement issues. These are discussed in the future research section. 
    Our  results  on  price  decisions  for  new  industrial  products  suggest  that  value-
informed pricing helps the firm in achieving superior new product performance. This is 
even more the case when relative product advantage is high. In the latter case, the firm 
increases  its  understanding  of  the  price  discretion  when  it  informs  itself  about  the 
customer’s  value  perception.  To  reap  the  benefits  of  having  a  high  relative  product 
advantage, firms should clearly take this into account in their price. However, in markets 
with  intense  competition,  the  contribution  of  value-informed  pricing  to  new  product 
performance  decreases,  since  the  upper-limit  of  the  price  discretion  is  unlikely  to  be 
sustainable. If the product has no superior advantage over competitors’ products, but aims 
to attack a competitor’s superior position - a so called “me too” product - competition-
informed  pricing  contributes  more  to  success.  In  this  situation,  competition-informed 
pricing informs the organization on the upper-limit of the price discretion, thus enhancing 
its ability to understand the price discretion. 
    Our results also suggest that cost-informed pricing increases the organization’s 
understanding  of  the  lower-limit  of  the  price  discretion,  thereby  contributing  to  new 
product performance. This is especially the case in competitively intense markets, where 
products may need to increasingly compete on price over time. The contribution of cost-
informed pricing to new product performance is not contingent upon the relative product 
advantage. This finding suggests that the use of cost information in price decisions for 
products offering superior advantages does not harm the product’s performance. In fact,   17
if the product is launched in market with intense competition, it is a successful practice. 
As  such,  the  only  situation  in  which  cost-informed  pricing  may  harm  new  product 
performance, is under very low competitive intensity. 
    As suggested by Nagle and Holden (1995) and Cressman (1999) our findings 
indicate that creating customer value, and pricing accordingly , is a route to new product 
performance. However, the degree to which value can be sustained is also an important 
consideration.  In  situations  in  which  firms  have  little  competition,  or  value  can  be 
sustained  otherwise  -  for  instance  through  protection  by  patents  -  a  combination  of 
creating customer value and value-informed pricing pays off. We find that new products 
that do not offer more value than competitors’ products are best priced on the basis of 
competitor information. For example, this seems to be a safe approach for companies 
following strong market leaders in highly concentrated markets. 
  The finding that the use of cost information has no negative effect on new product 
performance in situations in which the firm has created superior customer value, and that 
it even has a positive effect in situations of intense competition, shines a new light on the 
results of prior studies. For instance, Coe (1990) interpreted an increase of cost-based 
pricing  throughout  the  1980s  as  a  consequence  of  a  parallel  decrease  of  innovation 
strategies. Our results suggest that the increased use of cost information in pricing can 
also  be  caused  by  the  growing  competition  during  that  decade.  Cressman  (1999) 
expresses  worries  about  the  high  percentage  of  firms  in  Noble  and  Gruca’s  (1999a) 
sample that engage in cost-based pricing (56 %), suggesting that these firms are ignorant 
about  the  market  in  price  decisions.  Taking  into  account  the  contribution  of  cost 
information to performance, this high percentage doesn’t seem worrisome after all.   18
  Finally, our study challenges the finding from Henard and Szymanski’s (2001) 
meta-analysis  that  relative  product  advantage  is  the  most  important  predictor  of  new 
product performance. In our study, value-informed pricing is a stronger predictor of new 
product performance than relative product advantage is. This finding may suggest that the 
importance of pricing practices have been underestimated in marketing literature for a 
long time and that the topic deserves more attention in future research. 
 
6.1 Limitations and Future Research 
This study has some limitations that present opportunities for future research. First, our 
study is limited in terms of the selected industries,the geographical scope, and sample 
size. The sample is restricted to firms from electronics and engineering industries. These 
industries are characterized by high fixed and low variable costs. The results may be 
different in industries that do not share these characteristics. The geographical scope is 
limited to Belgium, and our hypotheses are tested on 77 observations. Second, we used 
single  informants  to  gather  our  data.  Future  research  may  replicate  our  research  in 
different industries and countries, gathering data from multiple informants in one firm. 
Third, we limited the contingency variables to relative product advantage and competitive 
intensity.  Future  research  could  examine  the  impact  of  other  product  and  market 
characteristics  that may influence the effectiveness of different price practices. Future 
research may also examine other pricing practices that may occur in a pricing process, 
such  as  determining  pricing  objectives,  and  it  may  study  different  types  of  pricing 
processes, such as price alterations.   19
  Finally, we came across four measurement issues that may benefit future research. 
First,  pricing  practices  are  different  from  pricing  strategies  and  thus  should  not  be 
included  in  the  same  measurement  instrument  (Coe  1990,  Noble  and  Gruca  1999a). 
Pricing practices refer to the use of information in a pricing process that leads to price 
decisions,  and  pricing  strategies  refers  to  how  the  firm  tries  to  achieve  its  pricing 
objectives in the market place. Second, the use of all three types of information (customer 
value, competition, and costs) should be included. Including only cost information in a 
study (e.g. Noble and Gruca 1999a) may lead to an incomplete picture of the degree to 
which firms include market information in their price decisions. Third, firms are unlikely 
to rely exclusively on a single type of information in a pricing process. Thus, a measure 
with mutually exclusive categories (Coe 1990, Piercy 1981, Udell 1972) is less likely to 
capture  the  diversity  in  the  types  of  information  used  in  a  pricing  process.  Fourth, 
measuring  the  degree  to  which  firms  use  different  types  of  information  in  a  pricing 
process might be prone to a social response bias. Managers tend to justify prices in terms 
of costs in order to leave an impression of a “fair” pricing practice (Pearce 1956, Foxall 
1972). For these reasons we developed multiple-item measures on the concepts of cost-
informed, value-informed, and competition-informed pricing, that indicate the degree to 
which different kinds of information are used to arrive at a price decision. Future research 
could develop these measurement instruments further.. 
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7. APPENDIX: SCALE ITEMS 
1 
 
To what degree were the following factors included in the price setting process of the 
new  product/service?  In  other  words:  to  what  extent  did  you  take  into  account  the 
following elements while determining the price of the new product/service? 
 
Value-Informed Pricing (Alpha = .81)  mean  Standard 
deviation 
The advantages of the product compared to competitors’ products  7.03  2.58 
The customer’s perceived value of the product  7.19  2.12 
The advantages the new product offers to the customer  7.34  2.52 
The balance between advantages of the product and price  6.91  2.39 
The advantages of the product compared to substitutes  6.72  2.62 
 
 Competition-Informed Pricing (Alpha = .91)     
The price of competitors’ products  7.05  2.57 
The competitor’s current price strategy  6.72  2.71 
The estimation of competitor’s strength to react  6.20  2.66 
The market structure (number and strength of competitors)  6.49  2.50 
The degree of competition on the market  7.12  2.48 
The competitive advantages of competitors on the market  5.62  2.79 
 
Cost-Informed Pricing (Alpha = .75)     
The variable costs of the product  5.16  2.32 
The price necessary for break-even  5.93  2.97 
The investments in the new product  5.62  2.57 
The share of fixed costs in the cost price  5.87  2.70 
 
Relative Product advantage (Alpha = .74) (Adapted from Atuahene-Gima 1995) 
The product offered higher quality than competing products  7.31  2.26 
The product solved problems customers have with competing products  6.84  2.44 
The product was very innovative and substituted an inferior alternative  6.50  2.79 
 
Competitive Intensity  (Alpha = .73) (Adapted from Atuahene-Gima 1995) 
Intense price competition  7.04  2.36 
Strong competitor sales, promotion and distribution systems  6.43  2.56 
Strong and good quality competing products or services  6.50  2.28 
 
New Product Performance (Alpha = .79) (Adapted from Atuahene-Gima 1995) 
Turnover objectives since its launch  7.41  1.90 
Profit objectives since its launch  6.86  2.03 
Marketshare objectives since its launch  7.25  2.05 
Competitive advantage objectives since its launch  7.19  2.28 
 
 
                                                           
1 All items are measured on 10-point Likert-type scales.   21
REFERENCES 
Abratt,  Russell  and  Leyland  F.  Pitt.  (1985).  “Pricing  Practices  in  Two  Industries,” 
Industrial Marketing Management, 14, 301-6. 
Achrol,  Ravi  S.  (1991).  “Evolution  of  the  Marketing  Organization:  New  Forms  for 
Turbulent Environments,” Journal of Marketing, 55 (October), 77-93. 
Anderson,  James  C.  and  James  A.  Narus.  (1999).  Business  Market  Management: 
Understanding, Creating, and Delivering Value. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice 
Hall. 
Armstrong, J. Scott and Terry Overton. (1977). “Estimating Nonresponse Bias in Mail 
Surveys,” Journal of Marketing Research, 14 (August), 396-402. 
Atuahene-Gima,  Kwaku.  (1995).  “An  Exploratory  Analysis  of  the  Impact  of  Market 
Orientation  on  New  Product  Performance-A  Contingency  approach,”  Journal  of 
Product Innovation Management, 12, 275-93. 
Bonoma,Thomas V., Victoria L. Crittenden, and Robert J. Dolan. (1988). “Can We Have 
Rigor and Relevance in Pricing Research.” In Timothy M. Devinney (ed.), Issues in 
Pricing, Theory and Research. Lexington, MA: Lexington, 337-59. 
Churchill,  Gilbert  A.  Jr.  (1979).  “A  Paradigm  for  Developing  Better  Measures  of 
Marketing Constructs,” Journal of Marketing Research, 16 (February), 64-73. 
Coe,  Barabara  J.  (1990).  “Strategy  in  Retreat:  Pricing  Drops  Out,”  The  Journal  of 
Business and Industrial Marketing, 5, (Winter/Spring), 5-25. 
Cressman,  George  S.  Jr.  (1999).  “Commentary  on:  “Industrial  Pricing:  Theory  and 
Managerial Practice”,” Marketing Science, 18 (3), 455-57.   22
Day,  George  S.  and  David  B.  Montgomery.  (1999).  “Charting  New  Directions  for 
Marketing,” Journal of Marketing, 63 (Special Issue), 3-13. 
Diamantopoulos,  Adamantios.  (1991).  “Pricing:  Theory  and  Evidence-A  Literature 
Review.” In M.J. Baker (ed.), Perspectives on Marketing Management. Chicester: 
John Wiley and Sons. 
Dutta,  Shantanu,  Mark  Zbaracki,  and  Mark  Bergen.  (2001).  “Pricing  Process  as  a 
Capability: A Case Study,” Marketing Science Institute Working Paper, No. 01-117. 
Cambridge, MA: Marketing Science Institute. 
Foxall,  Gordon.  (1972).  “A  Descriptive  Theory  of  Pricing  for  Marketing,”  European 
Journal of Marketing, 6 (3), 190-4. 
Frambach, Ruud T., Ed J. Nijssen, and H. Van Heddegem (1997). “Industrial Pricing 
Practices  and  Determinants  in  Two  Sectors.”  In:  Hartline  and  Thorne  (eds.). 
Marketing  Theory  and  Applications,  AMA  Winter  Educators’  Conference 
Proceedings, Vol. 8. Chicago: American Marketing Association, 126-33. 
Gatignon, Hubert and Jean-Marc Xuereb. (1997). “Strategic Orientation of the Firm and 
New Product Performance,” Journal of Marketing Research, 34 (February), 77-90. 
Gijsbrechts, Els. (1993). “Prices and Pricing Research in Consumer Marketing: Some 
Recent Developments,” International Journal of Research in Marketing, 10, 115-51. 
Hague, D.C. (1971). Pricing in Business. London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd. 
Hair, Joseph F. Jr., Rolph E. Anderson, Ronald L. Tatham, and William C. Black (1995). 
Multivariate Data Analysis with Readings. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall. 
Henard, David H. and David M. Szymanski. (2001). “Why Some New Products Are 
More Successful Than Others,” Journal of Marketing Research, 38 (August), 362-75.   23
Homburg, Christian and Christian Pflesser. (2000). “A Multiple-Layer Model of Market-
Oriented Organizational Culture: Measurement Issues and Performance Outcomes,” 
Journal of Marketing Research, 37 (November), 449-62. 
Irwin, Julie R. and Gary H. McClelland. (2001). “Misleading Heuristics and Moderated 
Multiple Regression Models,” Journal of Marketing Research, 38 (February), 100-9. 
Kline, Rex B. (1998). Principles and Practice of Structural Equation Modelling. New 
York: Guilford Press. 
Monroe, Kent B. (1990). Pricing: Making Profitable Decisions. New York: McGraw-
Hill. 
Monroe,  Kent  B.  and  Tradib  Mazumdar.  (1988).  “Pricing-Decision  Models:  Recent 
Developments and Opportunities.” In Timothy M. Devinney (ed.), Issues in Pricing, 
Theory and Research. Lexington, MA: Lexington, 360-88. 
Nagle, Thomas T. and Read K. Holden. (1995). The Strategy and Tactics of Pricing: A 
Guide to Profitable Decision Making. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall. 
Noble,  Peter  M.  and  Thomas  S.  Gruca.  (1999a).  “Industrial  Pricing:  Theory  and 
Managerial Practice,” Marketing Science, 18 (3), 435-54. 
Noble,  Peter  M.  and  Thomas  S.  Gruca.  (1999b).  “Response  to  the  Comments  on 
“Industrial Pricing: Theory and Managerial Practice”,” Marketing Science, 18 (3), 
458-59. 
Oxenfeldt, Alfred R. (1973). “A Decision-Making Structure for Price Decisions,” Journal 
of Marketing, 37 (January), 48-53. 
Pashigian, B. Peter (1998). Price Theory and Applications. New York: Irwin/McGraw-
Hill.   24
Pearce, I.F. (1956). “A Study in Price Policy,” Economica, 23 (May), 114-127. 
Piercy,  Nigel.  (1981).  “British  Export  Market  Selection  and  Pricing,”  Industrial 
Marketing Management, 10, 287-97. 
Rao, Vithala R. (1984). “Pricing Research in Marketing: The State of the Art,” Journal of 
Business, 57 (1), S39-60. 
Schoonhoven,  Claudia  Bird.  (1981).  “Problems  with  Contingency  Theory:  Testing 
Assumptions Hidden within the Language of Contingency “Theory”,” Administrative 
Science Quarterly, 26, 349-77. 
Shapiro, Benson P. and Barbara B. Jackson. (1978). “Industrial Pricing to Meet Customer 
Needs,” Harvard Business Review, 56 (November-December), 119-27. 
Tellis, Gerard J. (1986). “Beyond the Many Faces of Price: An Integration of Pricing 
Strategies,” Journal of Marketing, 50 (October), 146-60. 
Tzokas,  Nikolaos,  Susan  Hart,  Paraskevas  Argouslidis,  and  Michael  Saren.  (2000). 
“Industrial Export Pricing Practices in the United Kingdom,” Industrial Marketing 
Management, 29, 191-204. 
Udell, Jon G. (1972). Successful Marketing Strategies in American Industry. Madison: 
Mimir. 
Ward, Scott and Frederick, E. Webster Jr. (1991). “Organizational Buying Behavior,” in 
Thomas S. Robertson and Harold H. Kassarajian (eds.), Handbook of Consumer 
Behavior. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 419-58.   25
 
Table 1: Hypotheses on the Success of Pricing Practices in Different Situations of 































aRead: (cell 1) the higher relative product advantage, the more value-informed pricing contributes to new 
product performance. This formulation is in line with what Schoonhoven (1981, p. 352) calls 
“multiplicative” in her discussion of functional forms in contingency theory. 
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Table 2: Correlation Matrix of Purified Measures
a 
    (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  Number 
of items 
Alpha 
(1)  Value-informed pricing            5  .81 
(2)  Competition-informed pricing  .01          6  .91 
(3)  Cost-informed pricing  .22  .04        4  .75 
(4)  Relative product advantage  .36  -.24  .01      3  .74 
(5)  Competitive intensity  .03  .34  .26  -.10    3  .73 
(6)  New product performance  .43  .08  .09  .23  .36  4  .79 
a: Correlations above r = .24 are significant at p < .05.  
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Table 3: Results of Moderating Regression Analyses (Standardized Coefficients) 
Dependent variable: New Product Performance 










A. Simple effects:         





Competition-informed pricing  -.02  -.04  .03  .06 
Cost-informed pricing  -.09  .07  .06  .03 
Product advantage  .12  .16
 d  .17
 c  .29
 b 
Competitive intensity  .39
 a  .30
 b  .36
b  .26
c 
Product advantage * competitive intensity        -.29
 b 
 
B. Interaction effects of product advantage with: 
       
Value-informed pricing    .32
b     
Competition-informed pricing    -.27
b     
Cost-informed pricing    .03     
 
C. Interaction effects of competitive intensity: 
       
Value-informed pricing      -.29
b   
Competition-informed pricing      -.07   
Cost-informed pricing      .16
d   
 
D. Interaction effects of product advantage * 
competitive intensity, with: 
       
Value-informed pricing        -.08 
Competition-informed pricing        -.28
c 


















2  .28  .41  .34  .40 
a: p < .001 (one-tailed significance) 
b: p < .01 
c: p < .05 
d: p < .1   28
Figure 1: Conceptual Orientation to Pricing 
  Based on Monroe (1990) 
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